The study investigates the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and the Egyptian firm performance. This study utilizes a sample of 50 firms using the accounting and market data available for the period [2004][2005][2006]. The sample firms are all listed in either the Cairo or Alexandria Stock. The cross-sectional regression analysis is employed to test the hypotheses of the study. The results indicate a positive significant relationship between firm performance and the percentage of outside directors in boards and the existence of institutional representatives in boards. Furthermore, a significant negative relationship exists between firm performance and board size, role duality and the existence of firm's website. The results also reveal a significant, positive relationship between firm performance measures and the percentage of women members in boards of directors in Egyptian firms. Our results support previous literature and show consistency with the agency theory.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is nowadays one of the most discussed topics by academics, practitioners and regulators. Most of the discussion is targeted at publicly held corporations. However, during the last few years the world has been shocked by numerous corporate scandals including WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, and Tyco. Those corporate scandals when combined with the Asian crisis during the late 1990s raise some questions: What are the best mechanisms that can be used to govern corporations? Does corporate governance matter? What is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance? Do the agency problems remain unresolved or could they be overcome through governance mechanisms? Those questions have resulted in academic and professional debates which contributed to originate a stream of research investigating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. In fact, most of previous studies on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance have been, in large scale, limited to those of developed countries or large emerging countries. Therefore, it seems that developing countries e.g. Egypt, are very understudied in the literature, so this study is an attempt to fill this gap by investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and firm performance of the top listed companies in Egypt. The Egyptian Exchange is one of the oldest stock markets established in the Middle East. The Egyptian Stock Exchange (ESE), now renamed "Egyptian Exchange" (EGX) and formerly known as Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE), traces its origins to 1883 when the Alexandria Stock Exchange was established, followed by the Cairo Stock Exchange in 1903. Alexandria and Cairo Stock Exchanges were competing with each other since their formation. In recent years the two exchanges were integrated. They are governed by the same board of directors and they share the same trading, clearing and settlement systems, so that market participants have access to stocks listed on both exchanges. The ESE was the fifth most active stock exchange worldwide prior to the nationalization of industries and acceptance of central planning policies in the early 1950s. These policies led to a considerable reduction in stock exchange activity and the market stayed largely inactive throughout the 1980s (Mecagni and Sourial, 1999) . The ESE began operating again as a market for capital only in 1990s, when the Egyptian government's restructuring and economic reform program resulted in the revival of the Egyptian stock market; and a major change in the organisation of the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges took place in January 1997 with the election of a new board of directors and the establishment of a number of board committees, which brought about significant modernisation, culminating in 2008 by the Exchange winning the award of the most innovative African Exchange during the annual Summit organized by Africa Investor in collaboration with NYSE Euronext. In the case of individuals, mutual funds and international funds, no taxes are levied on dividends, capital gains and interest on bonds. There is no stamp duty on securities. Profits of Egyptian corporations from investing in securities are subject to capital gains tax (www.egyptse.com). EGX"s life cycle could be divided into three distinct stages at which it experienced dramatic changes. Firstly, it was very active since its establishment till 1940s in which it reached its vertex as it was ranked the fifth stock exchange in the world (Abdel-Shahid, 2003). That era was followed by dramatic changes in the Egyptian social and economic structure through the adoption of socialist, central planning, and nationalization policies that had led to a severe reduction in the level of activities of the EGX which started a dormancy stage that lasted till early 1990. In 1991-1992, the Egyptian government introduced programs of economic reform and restructuring; this period was characterized by a rapid movement towards a free market economy and a process of deregulation and privatization which stimulated the economy and led to the revival of the EGX. During the last few years EGX has experienced many changes regarding its size, number of listed companies, regulations, and structure. Egypt offers a very interesting environment for studying the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firms" performance because of i) the Egyptian rules and regulations are based on the French civil law of companies, and the French civil law provides less protection to shareholder, which contradicts common-law countries like UK and USA which provide a high level of shareholders" protection. In those countries, the corporate governance codes are serving as a compensation for the inherent lack in the legal systems (Berg and Capoul, 2004) ; ii) the Egyptian economy during the last few years has experienced integration in the global economy through the internationalization of the capital market which resulted in increasing the importance of the private sector in the economy (Abdel-Shahid, 2001); iii) many Egyptian listed companies are closely held by a very few number of shareholders as a result of the Egyptian tax law which encourages listing, and in addition many small-size companies that are listed in the EGX would not be listed in any other stock market around the world (Berg and Capoul, 2004) ; and iv) Egypt has observed an increasing interest among academics and practitioners to corporate governance. This interest can be noticed by a number of proposed codes of corporate governance in Egypt combined with some reports aiming to evaluate the compliance of the Egyptian companies with international corporate governance principles and standards such as the code issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These reports and codes were started by the delegation from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to prepare a report on the observance of the corporate governance standards and codes (ROSC) which aimed to evaluate the recent improvements in the corporate governance regulations in Egypt through evaluating the compliance with the five main principles of the corporate governance code issued by the OECD; namely, the rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board of directors. This report shows that although there is no corporate governance standard that is completely not observed, most of standards are not completely observed either. This report is supported by report conducted by Fawzy (2003) , for the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies. The report concluded that, although the standards of corporate governance in Egypt have been improved significantly over the last few years, the degree of progress varies among different principles. It has also pointed out that Egyptian firms are still far from properly implementing corporate governance principles. These reports are followed by some proposed corporate governance codes which are issued by different institutions, such as the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) in 2006. In conclusion, all these trials to develop a corporate governance code in Egypt and the globally increasing attention to corporate governance have not yet convinced the Egyptian companies of the tremendous benefits that they will yield if they comply with corporate governance principles. This was one of the motives behind this study, which is conducted to contribute to building the trust in the effects from adopting corporate governance principles by the Egyptian companies on their performance. This study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 is to present the methodology and data set used in the study and to explain the detailed analytical procedures used to test hypotheses. Section 4 shows and explains the study results. Finally, section 5 concludes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The association between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance is considered one of the most controversial issues in corporate finance, yet this relationship is suffering both a theoretical mixture and empirical ambiguity. The following section reviews relevant literature and develops the main hypotheses of the current study.
Board Size and firm performance
Board size refers to the total number of directors in a company (Hermalin and Weusbach, 1991 H1: There is not a significant relationship between board size and firm performance.
Board composition and firm performance
Board composition, board independency or the percentage of outside directors in the board has received a great interest in the academic literature. Outside directors are those directors who are not working in the firms. The importance of the outside directors in boards and its effect on firm performance has always been a subject of theoretical and empirical debate. The agency theory supports the notion that boards of directors should include a majority of outside directors as they are independent of the management and are more willing to effectively monitor the management. On the other hand, stewardship theory suggests that control should be kept in the hands of inside directors as there is no need for independent monitoring devices on people, who are considered trustworthy and committed. A number of studies found that a higher proportion of non-executive directors in the board would result in higher performance of the company (Preffer, 1972; Baysinger and Butler, 1985) . These studies argued that non-executive directors would have less biasness in their role as a monitoring officer. Proponents to boards dominated by outsiders argued that nonexecutive directors provide superior performance to the firm as they are independent from firm"s management (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) . Moreover, Lauenstein (1981) pointed out that outside directors are in a better position to see the "big picture" and are more able to make strategic changes when needed. The same opinion was stated by Kesner and Dalton (1986) (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990 ). Empirical studies found that a higher proportion of executive directors would result in better performance as they could communicate and liaise with the management (Kesner, 1987; Peng et al., 2003) . These studies argued that executive directors would assist the management in the day-to-day operations which eventuate in high levels of performance. Uadiale (2010) suggests that the composition of outside directors as members of the board should be sustained and improved upon to enhance corporate financial performance. Bozec (2005) examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance by using data that covers the period 1976-2000 for State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) in Canada. He pointed out a negative association between board outsiders and firm performance. The same conclusion has been reached by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who investigated the interdependence among different mechanisms used to control agency cost in the US context. They have also found a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance. This negative relationship is concluded in many empirical studies (e.g. H2: there is not a significant relationship between board composition and firm performance.
Role duality and firm performance
Agency theory argues that personal separation of the CEO and chairperson roles is important to develop effective monitoring by the board. If the CEO and chair of the board are the same person, agency theory argues that this is likely to create abuse of power, since this person will be very powerful without effective checks and balances to control her or him. Consequently, agency theory predicts that firms with separation of the CEO and the chair of the board perform better than their counterparts without separation (Fama and Jensen, 1983 H3: there is not a significant relationship between role duality and firm performance.
Board diversity and firm performance
The issue of board diversity is not commonly discussed in the corporate governance literature. However, during the last few years there has been an increasing emphasis on the gender of top executives and board members of firms. 
Identity of the largest blockholder and firm performance
The role of large shareholders on firms" governance has been studied from the theoretical and empirical perspective, since Shleifer and Vishny (1986) pointed out an agency problem in listed corporations that arises when large shareholders and dispersed and atomistic minority shareholders face a possible tender offer. Their model shows the conditions that minimize the free rider problem by reducing the takeover premium of the external raider and increasing the market value of the firm. Large blockholders serve as an internal control on managerial behaviour when there is an effective separation between ownership and control. Monitoring reduces management"s perkconsumption and overinvestment in risky projects. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that control structures with multiple shareholders may be the most efficient ownership structure in environments with poor shareholder protection because controlling coalitions can align their incentives to prevent extraction of rents. Bloch and Hege (2001) also claim that multiple blockholders can compensate for the poor legal protection of minorities. They argue that the relevant concept of control is the contestability of an incumbent shareholder"s position of power and that corporate control is contestable if the incumbent cannot increase the level of control rents without losing a control contest. In their model, the presence of two or more large blockholders acts to limit private rent extraction and attracts the votes of the minority shareholders when proposals are contested. Maury and Pajuste (2005) develop a model on the effect of multiple blockholders in a company and empirically implement it on the Finnish market. Maury and Pajuste (2005) find that the effect of multiple blockholders is not necessarily positive and primarily depends upon the size and identity of these large shareholders. Analysing family firms their findings indicate a value reduction for firms in which the family dissociates ownership and control through control-enhancing mechanisms as it allows for a higher probability to extract private benefits. A second large shareholder could reduce this effect.
Their results suggest that a second blockholder only has a positive influence on firm value if it is not another family. Thus, the presence of two families in a company destroys even more value while the presence of a second non-family blockholder lowers the possibility of extraction of private benefits. The findings reported in these studies are inconclusive. Therefore, the following hypothesis is set to test the relationship between the identity of the largest shareholder and firm performance.
H7
: there is not a significant relationship between the identity of the largest shareholder and firm performance.
Institutional representatives in the Board and firm performance
The Egyptian corporate law permits institutional investors to have representatives from their companies in the boards of directors of the firm at which they hold ownership. Institutional investors are considered as a major governance mechanism that improves firm performance. Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , among others, argue that institutional investors are well-informed and practice their voting rights systematically to monitor the managers. They explain the so-called "active monitoring hypothesis" which expects a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. The relationship between institutional investors in the boards and firm performance was tested by Cornett et al. (2007) , who pointed out a positive relationship between the number of institutional investors in the boards and firm performance measured by adjusted return on assets which is consistent with the assumption of the agency theory. However, Pound (1988) expects a negative relationship due to the strategic alignment between the institutional investors and the managers of the firm. Boards dominated by institutional representatives will experience more conflicts among board members. Moreover, institutional representatives are required-not only motivated-to achieve the interests of a single shareholder party regardless of the interests of the remaining shareholders groups. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H8
: there is not a significant relationship between the existence of institutional shareholder representatives in the boards and firm performance.
Website and firm performance
This relationship is extracted from the first principle of the OECD corporate governance principles, which is "the corporate governance framework should protect shareholders" rights. Basic shareholders" rights include the right to obtain relevant information about the corporation on a timely and regular basis" and websites are the lowest cost and the most efficient way to provide shareholders this right. Brynjolfsson et al. (2000) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2001) have found evidence of a relation between investment in information technology and an improvement in global business performance, and not only productivity of work factor. Taking as a global result indicator Tobin"s Q ratio, based on the firm"s value in the stock market, they concluded that those firms which invested more in IT achieved superior results. This association was stronger when the organization, along with the investment in IT, underwent a structural reorganization involving interdisciplinary workgroups, an increase in independent decisionmaking and a support for employee training. This positive view of the competitive impact of IT has, nevertheless, failed to convince many authors in this field. Strassmann (1998; 1999) , for example, has not found evidence of a relation between IT investmentin which we can include technologies based on TCP/IP -and an increase in either productivity or company results (McCune, 1998) . More recently, during the second half of the nineties, the discussion on the correlation between information technology and company results has seen a new development regarding strategic development. Specifically, the paradigm that sees an organization as a reflection of its internal resources, or resource-based view of the firm (Wernelfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; 
Firm size
The firm size is proved to have an effect on firm performance and is used widely in the empirical literature of corporate governance because it has a direct effect on firm performance. However, firm size could have an ambiguous effect on firm performance. For example, larger firms can be less efficient than smaller ones because they may encounter more government bureaucracy, more redundancy and bigger agency problems (Sun et al., 2002) . But, large firms may turn out to be more efficient as they are likely to exploit economies of scale, employ more skilled managers and exercise market power (Kumar, 2004) . Firm size is expected to have a positive sign for its impact on the performance due to the following reasons: i) larger firms are more able to undertake profitable projects (Aljifri and Mousafa, 2007) ; ii) larger firms are more able to find markets for their products and to hire a qualified workforce (Al-Khouri, 2005); iii) larger firms are more diversified, have economies of scale, and have access to new technologies and cheaper sources of funds (Leng, 2004; French, 1995 and Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002) . Firm size is used as a control variable in most of the studies investigating the corporate governance/firm performance relationship. The hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
H10: There is not a significant relationship between firm size and firm performance.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATASET
In this study, ordinary least squares (OLS) is employed by regressing corporate governance variables on various measures of firm performance. This study uses three measures of firm performance, namely, ROA, ROE and Tobin"s Q. We test the following model of firm performance:  ROA is the return on assets. It is measured by the ratio of net income divided by total assets.  ROE is the return on equity. It is measured by the ratio of net income divided by shareholders" equity  TOBIN'S Q: it is usually defined as the market value of equity divided by the replacement cost of total assets. Tobin"s Q reflects the growth opportunities or in other words expectations about a firm"s growth prospects in the future. Due to the limitation of the available data, this study calculates Tobin's q as the result of the market value of equity plus the book value of the debt divided by the book value of the total assets. shareholdings owned by the largest block holder as a proxy for ownership concentration, and it is measured by shareholdings of the largest owner.  IDENT denotes identity of the largest owner, whether the largest shareholder is an institution or not. This conveys the differences in monitoring capabilities of different block holders and it is measured by a dummy variable which takes 1 if the largest owner is a private institution and 0 otherwise.  INST denotes institutional representatives and is measured by a dummy variable which takes1 if board of director includes institutional representative and 0 if not.  WSITE denotes website and whether the firm has a web site or not. It is used as a proxy for meeting shareholders" right of having timely and regular information about the firm and is measured by a dummy variable; it takes 1 if the firm has a website and 0 if not.  SIZE denotes size and is measured by the natural logarithm of the firm"s market value. The study data are obtained from the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX), which is the official provider of financial and non-financial information for companies listed in the stock market (www.egyptse.com). The sample represents the top 50 listed companies in the Egyptian stock exchange. The sample accounts for about 75% of the total market capitalization of the Egyptian market and about 80% of the total value and volume of trade for the period 2004-2006. The time frame for this study covers the period between 2004 and 2006, so as to allow some longitudinal dimension to the data; and, as a result, the estimation process draws on a panel data of firms and years making a total of 150 observations. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the study variables. It is noted from Table 1 that the sample reflects a broad range of variation in the sample. ROA and ROE do vary among the sample firms. The percentage of free float and of the largest owner reflects the compliance with the ownership concentration structure that characterizes most of the emerging markets. The percentage of the managerial ownership reflects the weak use of the managerial stock as a governance mechanism to deal with the agency problem in the Egyptian firms. The board size of Egyptian firms is averaged to 10.74 which is consistent with the findings of previous studies. The percentage of the outside members in the boards is averaged to 78%. Boards in the Egyptian firms are dominated by outsiders. The average percentage of the women members in the board of directors reflects a very weak participation of women in the Egyptian companies" boards which is consistent with the case in most of the emerging countries. Finally, the above table shows that CEO/chairman duality is common among the boards of Egyptian companies as well as the existence of institutional representatives in the board of directors. It is clear also that a very high percentage of the Egyptian listed companies (59%) do not have websites. This is consistent with the research done by EIoD in 2008.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This study has employed ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression. The first step of the analysis is to diagnose the critical assumptions of each test. The multivariate regression assumption of multicollinearity has been tested using the correlation matrix shown in Table 2 . The correlation matrix shows that the Pearson correlation coefficients are less than the 0.70 limit-pointed out by Gujarati (2004) who argued that multicollinearity might be a problem when the correlation equals or exceeds 0.70. The following section summarizes the multiple regression results. VIF and Tolerance tests do not also show any indication of colinearity (tests are not reported to save space). Table 3 summarizes the results of the OLS regression models. (2010) . A significant negative relationship has been found between role duality and firm performance measures. This result is consistent with the agency theory arguments and contradicts those of the stewardship theory which argued that managers are trustworthy enough to eliminate the need of other control devices and that duality may curb the success of managers with a prosperity vision. This negative relationship is not consistent with the findings of Boyd (1995) and Davis et al. (1997) who argued that managers are trustworthy and they will not use their power as a chairman to achieve personal interests at the expense of shareholders" rights. One of the most interesting results of this study is the positive association between the percentage of women in boards of directors and both accounting and market measures of firm performance. This finding supports the arguments of Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) who argued that women directors may increase the creativity and the quality of the firm"s decisionmaking process. A significant positive relationship has been found between the percentage of outside directors and firm performance. The significance of the relationship appears to be much stronger with the market measures than with accounting measures. This relationship supports the arguments of the agency theory which assume that outside directors are independent of the management and are more willing to effectively monitor -and if required change-the manager. The same conclusions have been reached by many researchers such as Kesner and Dalton (2002) ; Leng (2004) and Helland and Sykuta (2005) . One interesting result is that corporate governance is independent from corporate ownership structure as managerial ownership is not significantly related to any measure of corporate performance, which is consistent with what was concluded by Shen Aljifri and Mousafa (2007) . This result may reflect an independent source of value creation, possibly due to market power and economies of scale and scope (Bohren and Odegaard, 2003) . In addition, the Egyptian large firms have more resources (e.g. more skilled managers) compared to medium and small firms which may help them to be more efficient to attract more investors and increase their firms' values.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on firm performance. Three measurements of firm performance, namely ROA, ROE and Tobin"s Q-ratio have been investigated against various corporate governance mechanisms including board size, role duality, composition and diversity. The effect of corporate ownership structure including managerial ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration has also been analyzed. Moreover, the effect of various firm characteristics on firm performance has also been investigated, such as the existence of institutional representatives on the board of directors and the existence of firm"s website. It shows an insignificant association between managerial ownership and firm performance measured by accounting and market measures. However, the results show a positive and significant relationship between the percentage of outside directors and firm performance. On the other hand, some governance variables exhibit a significant negative relationship with firm performance, such as the size of the board of director"s, role duality and the existence of firm"s website. The latter represents another interesting finding which means that firms which have website have been performing worse than firms without one. One reason which could justify this result is that the electronic business is not completely established in Egypt. It also reflects the structure of the Egyptian market which is dominated by classical and more traditional philosophies of management. The structure of the Egyptian market shows also a dominance of governmental owned firms with a relatively small number of privately owned firms with modern management styles, but they are still not stable and not as profitable as the governmental classical corporations. In conclusion, the results of this study are consistent with the notion that internal corporate governance mechanisms are more efficient in emerging markets with weak external market capital mechanisms. Moreover, some findings are consistent with the assumptions of agency theory. However, this finding is not conclusive as some other findings are consistent with the assumptions of stewardship theory. While this study employs the top 50 companies in the Egyptian Exchange, which account for more than 75 % of the total market capitalization and more than 80 % of the total value and volume of trade, it would be useful for future research to use a larger sample in order to acquire a broader presentation of the market and to build more accurate conclusions about the Egyptian market. This study deals with the financial information and corporate governance data for the period 2004-2006 which is considered a peak period in the Egyptian Exchange regarding the growth in the value and volumes of trade. This might yield misleading conclusions, so it could be better for future research to incorporate more years in order to capture more market moves. In addition, future research should incorporate more variables of corporate governance. In this regard it could be helpful to use a survey to collect primary data on corporate governance mechanisms instead of depending on secondary data which imposes many limitations over the scope of the research. The area of the board of directors" diversity has received very little attention in the corporate governance literature. Although, it is very important as it affects the performance of the board and hence affects firm performance. This study has dealt with the gender diversity among board members. However, further research is needed to consider other aspects of diversity such as racial diversity, language diversity, age diversity, and educational and industrial background diversity. Most of corporate governance studies deal with institutional investors as shareholders with high monitoring capabilities with minor consideration to the nature of this institution or its identity. Institution"s identity could largely affect its monitoring capabilities and hence affect its governance role. So, further research is needed to consider the effect of institution"s identity on its governance role. Similarly, there is the identity of the largest owners or the "block holders" and whether individuals, institutions, holding companies, or insiders will affect their monitoring power; therefore, further research should consider the effect of the block holder"s identity on firm"s performance. Future research should be conducted taking into consideration some important corporate governance variables, such as the insider ownership, the voting coalitions and product-market competition. Further research can also compare Egypt with other developing countries or developed countries to find out any unique characteristics of corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, this study has used the existence of a firm"s website as a proxy to a shareholder"s right to obtain timely and accurate information about the company without taking into account the content of the website and whether it provides financial information or information that could help investors taking investment decisions or not. Then future research should take into account the content of the websites. Therefore, further research should consider the effect of online reporting on corporate governance and firm performance in Egypt (see, for example; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; and Elsayed et al., 2010) . Finally this study has dealt with board composition or the proportion of outside directors on board of directors as a measure of board independency. However, for the board members to be independent it is not enough to be non-executive but there should be further focus on the family and business ties that could affect that independency, therefore, future research should focus on all dimensions of board independency.
